mirror of
https://github.com/strukturag/nextcloud-spreed-signaling
synced 2024-06-26 09:20:14 +02:00
Merge pull request #747 from strukturag/improve-real-ip
Improve detection of actual client IP.
This commit is contained in:
commit
cad442c486
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@ -309,6 +309,8 @@ interface on port `8080` below):
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# Enable proxying Websocket requests to the standalone signaling server.
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# Enable proxying Websocket requests to the standalone signaling server.
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ProxyPass "/standalone-signaling/" "ws://127.0.0.1:8080/"
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ProxyPass "/standalone-signaling/" "ws://127.0.0.1:8080/"
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RequestHeader set X-Real-IP %{REMOTE_ADDR}s
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RewriteEngine On
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RewriteEngine On
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# Websocket connections from the clients.
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# Websocket connections from the clients.
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RewriteRule ^/standalone-signaling/spreed/$ - [L]
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RewriteRule ^/standalone-signaling/spreed/$ - [L]
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@ -344,6 +346,7 @@ myserver.domain.invalid {
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route /standalone-signaling/* {
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route /standalone-signaling/* {
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uri strip_prefix /standalone-signaling
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uri strip_prefix /standalone-signaling
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reverse_proxy http://127.0.0.1:8080
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reverse_proxy http://127.0.0.1:8080
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header_up X-Real-IP {remote_host}
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}
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}
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}
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}
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```
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```
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45
hub.go
45
hub.go
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@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ import (
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"net"
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"net"
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"net/http"
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"net/http"
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"net/url"
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"net/url"
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"slices"
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"strings"
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"strings"
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"sync"
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"sync"
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"sync/atomic"
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"sync/atomic"
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@ -2586,24 +2587,48 @@ func GetRealUserIP(r *http.Request, trusted *AllowedIps) string {
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return addr
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return addr
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}
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}
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// Don't check any headers if the server can be reached by untrusted clients directly.
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if trusted == nil || !trusted.Allowed(ip) {
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if trusted == nil || !trusted.Allowed(ip) {
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return addr
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return addr
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}
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}
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if ip := r.Header.Get("X-Real-IP"); ip != "" {
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if realIP := r.Header.Get("X-Real-IP"); realIP != "" {
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return ip
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if ip := net.ParseIP(realIP); len(ip) > 0 {
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return realIP
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}
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}
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}
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if ip := r.Header.Get("X-Forwarded-For"); ip != "" {
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// See https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Headers/X-Forwarded-For#selecting_an_ip_address
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// Result could be a list "clientip, proxy1, proxy2", so only use first element.
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forwarded := strings.Split(strings.Join(r.Header.Values("X-Forwarded-For"), ","), ",")
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if pos := strings.Index(ip, ","); pos >= 0 {
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if len(forwarded) > 0 {
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ip = strings.TrimSpace(ip[:pos])
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slices.Reverse(forwarded)
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var lastTrusted string
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for _, hop := range forwarded {
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hop = strings.TrimSpace(hop)
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// Make sure to remove any port.
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if host, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(hop); err == nil {
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hop = host
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}
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ip := net.ParseIP(hop)
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if len(ip) == 0 {
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continue
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}
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if trusted.Allowed(ip) {
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lastTrusted = hop
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continue
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}
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return hop
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}
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}
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// Make sure to remove any port.
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if host, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(ip); err == nil {
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// If all entries in the "X-Forwarded-For" list are trusted, the left-most
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ip = host
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// will be the client IP. This can happen if a subnet is trusted and the
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// client also has an IP from this subnet.
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if lastTrusted != "" {
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return lastTrusted
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}
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}
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return ip
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}
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}
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return addr
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return addr
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202
hub_test.go
202
hub_test.go
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@ -3596,59 +3596,159 @@ func TestJoinRoomSwitchClient(t *testing.T) {
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}
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}
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func TestGetRealUserIP(t *testing.T) {
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func TestGetRealUserIP(t *testing.T) {
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REMOTE_ATTR := "192.168.1.2"
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testcases := []struct {
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expected string
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trustedProxies, err := ParseAllowedIps("192.168.0.0/16")
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headers http.Header
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if err != nil {
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trusted string
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t.Fatal(err)
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addr string
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}{
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{
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"192.168.1.2",
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nil,
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"192.168.0.0/16",
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"192.168.1.2:23456",
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},
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{
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"10.11.12.13",
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nil,
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"192.168.0.0/16",
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"10.11.12.13:23456",
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},
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{
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"10.11.12.13",
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http.Header{
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http.CanonicalHeaderKey("x-real-ip"): []string{"10.11.12.13"},
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},
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"192.168.0.0/16",
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"192.168.1.2:23456",
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},
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{
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"11.12.13.14",
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http.Header{
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http.CanonicalHeaderKey("x-forwarded-for"): []string{"11.12.13.14, 192.168.30.32"},
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},
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"192.168.0.0/16",
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"192.168.1.2:23456",
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},
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// "X-Real-IP" has preference before "X-Forwarded-For"
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{
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"10.11.12.13",
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http.Header{
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http.CanonicalHeaderKey("x-real-ip"): []string{"10.11.12.13"},
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http.CanonicalHeaderKey("x-forwarded-for"): []string{"11.12.13.14, 192.168.30.32"},
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},
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"192.168.0.0/16",
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"192.168.1.2:23456",
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},
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// Multiple "X-Forwarded-For" headers are merged.
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{
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"11.12.13.14",
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http.Header{
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http.CanonicalHeaderKey("x-forwarded-for"): []string{"11.12.13.14", "192.168.30.32"},
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},
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"192.168.0.0/16",
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"192.168.1.2:23456",
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},
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// Headers are ignored if coming from untrusted clients.
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{
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"10.11.12.13",
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http.Header{
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http.CanonicalHeaderKey("x-real-ip"): []string{"11.12.13.14"},
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},
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"192.168.0.0/16",
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"10.11.12.13:23456",
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},
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{
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"10.11.12.13",
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http.Header{
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http.CanonicalHeaderKey("x-forwarded-for"): []string{"11.12.13.14, 192.168.30.32"},
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},
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"192.168.0.0/16",
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"10.11.12.13:23456",
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},
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// X-Forwarded-For is filtered for trusted proxies.
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{
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"1.2.3.4",
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http.Header{
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http.CanonicalHeaderKey("x-forwarded-for"): []string{"11.12.13.14, 1.2.3.4"},
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},
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"192.168.0.0/16",
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"192.168.1.2:23456",
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},
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{
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"1.2.3.4",
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http.Header{
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http.CanonicalHeaderKey("x-forwarded-for"): []string{"11.12.13.14, 1.2.3.4, 192.168.2.3"},
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},
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"192.168.0.0/16",
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"192.168.1.2:23456",
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},
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{
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"10.11.12.13",
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http.Header{
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http.CanonicalHeaderKey("x-forwarded-for"): []string{"11.12.13.14, 1.2.3.4"},
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},
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"192.168.0.0/16",
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"10.11.12.13:23456",
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},
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// Invalid IPs are ignored.
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{
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"192.168.1.2",
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http.Header{
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http.CanonicalHeaderKey("x-real-ip"): []string{"this-is-not-an-ip"},
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},
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"192.168.0.0/16",
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"192.168.1.2:23456",
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},
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{
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"11.12.13.14",
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http.Header{
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http.CanonicalHeaderKey("x-real-ip"): []string{"this-is-not-an-ip"},
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http.CanonicalHeaderKey("x-forwarded-for"): []string{"11.12.13.14, 192.168.30.32"},
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},
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"192.168.0.0/16",
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"192.168.1.2:23456",
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},
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{
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"11.12.13.14",
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http.Header{
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http.CanonicalHeaderKey("x-real-ip"): []string{"this-is-not-an-ip"},
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http.CanonicalHeaderKey("x-forwarded-for"): []string{"11.12.13.14, 192.168.30.32, proxy1"},
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},
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"192.168.0.0/16",
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"192.168.1.2:23456",
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},
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{
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"192.168.1.2",
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http.Header{
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http.CanonicalHeaderKey("x-forwarded-for"): []string{"this-is-not-an-ip"},
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},
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"192.168.0.0/16",
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"192.168.1.2:23456",
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},
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{
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"192.168.2.3",
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http.Header{
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http.CanonicalHeaderKey("x-forwarded-for"): []string{"this-is-not-an-ip, 192.168.2.3"},
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},
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"192.168.0.0/16",
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"192.168.1.2:23456",
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},
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}
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}
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request := &http.Request{
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for _, tc := range testcases {
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RemoteAddr: REMOTE_ATTR + ":23456",
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trustedProxies, err := ParseAllowedIps(tc.trusted)
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}
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if err != nil {
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if ip := GetRealUserIP(request, trustedProxies); ip != REMOTE_ATTR {
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t.Errorf("invalid trusted proxies in %+v: %s", tc, err)
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t.Errorf("Expected %s but got %s", REMOTE_ATTR, ip)
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continue
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}
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}
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request := &http.Request{
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X_REAL_IP := "192.168.10.11"
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RemoteAddr: tc.addr,
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request.Header = http.Header{
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Header: tc.headers,
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http.CanonicalHeaderKey("x-real-ip"): []string{X_REAL_IP},
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}
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}
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if ip := GetRealUserIP(request, trustedProxies); ip != tc.expected {
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if ip := GetRealUserIP(request, trustedProxies); ip != X_REAL_IP {
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t.Errorf("Expected %s for %+v but got %s", tc.expected, tc, ip)
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t.Errorf("Expected %s but got %s", X_REAL_IP, ip)
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}
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}
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// "X-Real-IP" has preference before "X-Forwarded-For"
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X_FORWARDED_FOR_IP := "192.168.20.21"
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X_FORWARDED_FOR := X_FORWARDED_FOR_IP + ":12345, 192.168.30.32"
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request.Header = http.Header{
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http.CanonicalHeaderKey("x-real-ip"): []string{X_REAL_IP},
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http.CanonicalHeaderKey("x-forwarded-for"): []string{X_FORWARDED_FOR},
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}
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if ip := GetRealUserIP(request, trustedProxies); ip != X_REAL_IP {
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t.Errorf("Expected %s but got %s", X_REAL_IP, ip)
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}
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request.Header = http.Header{
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http.CanonicalHeaderKey("x-forwarded-for"): []string{X_FORWARDED_FOR},
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}
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if ip := GetRealUserIP(request, trustedProxies); ip != X_FORWARDED_FOR_IP {
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t.Errorf("Expected %s but got %s", X_FORWARDED_FOR_IP, ip)
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}
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PUBLIC_IP := "1.2.3.4"
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request.RemoteAddr = PUBLIC_IP + ":1234"
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request.Header = http.Header{
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http.CanonicalHeaderKey("x-real-ip"): []string{X_REAL_IP},
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}
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if ip := GetRealUserIP(request, trustedProxies); ip != PUBLIC_IP {
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t.Errorf("Expected %s but got %s", PUBLIC_IP, ip)
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}
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request.Header = http.Header{
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http.CanonicalHeaderKey("x-forwarded-for"): []string{X_FORWARDED_FOR},
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}
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if ip := GetRealUserIP(request, trustedProxies); ip != PUBLIC_IP {
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t.Errorf("Expected %s but got %s", PUBLIC_IP, ip)
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}
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}
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}
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}
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@ -9,7 +9,8 @@
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#debug = false
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#debug = false
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# Comma separated list of trusted proxies (IPs or CIDR networks) that may set
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# Comma separated list of trusted proxies (IPs or CIDR networks) that may set
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# the "X-Real-Ip" or "X-Forwarded-For" headers.
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# the "X-Real-Ip" or "X-Forwarded-For" headers. If both are provided, the
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# "X-Real-Ip" header will take precedence (if valid).
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# Leave empty to allow loopback and local addresses.
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# Leave empty to allow loopback and local addresses.
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#trustedproxies =
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#trustedproxies =
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|
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@ -35,7 +35,8 @@ debug = false
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#allowsubscribeany = false
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#allowsubscribeany = false
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# Comma separated list of trusted proxies (IPs or CIDR networks) that may set
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# Comma separated list of trusted proxies (IPs or CIDR networks) that may set
|
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# the "X-Real-Ip" or "X-Forwarded-For" headers.
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# the "X-Real-Ip" or "X-Forwarded-For" headers. If both are provided, the
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# "X-Real-Ip" header will take precedence (if valid).
|
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# Leave empty to allow loopback and local addresses.
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# Leave empty to allow loopback and local addresses.
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#trustedproxies =
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#trustedproxies =
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
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Loading…
Reference in a new issue